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ple general equilibrium model. A two-sector model is developed where the wage
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or centralised by a large union covering all workers. Worker’s outside option is
employment in the second sector with wages adjusting to clear the market. The
paper shows that social welfare depends on (i) whether the union considers the
connection between wages in both sectors, (ii) the structure of the union’s objec-
tive function, and (iii) the elasticities of labour demand. The welfare maximising
employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralisation if
the union maximises the total wage-bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximis-
ing, neither centralised nor decentralised wage setting yield the social optimum.
A second best optimum can then be obtained under decentralised bargaining.
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1 Introduction
There is a broad consensus among labour economists that unions cause labour market
distortions since they tend to raise the wage above its market-clearing level. However,
it is not obvious, neither empirically nor theoretically, how this distortion depend on the
size of the union and the structure of the wage setting. Thus, it seems interesting to shed
some more light on the question if bigger unions acting centralised and comprehending
more workers are more harmful for economic welfare – or if they are better able to
internalise externalities of their wage setting behaviour than small unions.
The seminal work by Calmfors & Driffill (1988) points out the ambiguous effects of
bargaining centralisation on labour market outcome. Elster (1989), Wallerstein (1990)
and Calmfors (1993) discuss several possible externalities caused by various degrees
of centralisation. A more comprehensive theoretical analysis on the economic implica-
tions of centralised versus decentralised wage bargaining can be found in Moene et al.
(1993). Besides, a number of theoretical contributions deal with the idea of a rela-
tionship between bargaining centralisation and labour market outcome. Most of them
study the effects of an endogenous unemployment insurance in a union wage bargain-
ing framework (Holmlund & Lundborg 1988, 1999, Kiander 1993, Sinko 2004). Hoel
(1990) analyses firm’s investment decision by abandoning the assumption of a fixed
capital stock, while Hoel (1991) studies the importance of labour mobility in a union
bargaining framework. Models dealing with labour taxation and tax burdens in cen-
tralised labour markets include Summers et al. (1993) and Kilponen & Sinko (2005).
They argue that unions recognise the connection between taxes on labour supply and
the public provision of goods if wage setting is more centralised. Empirical evidence
can be found in Daveri & Tabellini (2000). Other papers not focussing on the level
of wages but on the wage structure study the relationship between the degree of cen-
tralisation and wage inequality (Wallerstein 1990, Rasmussen 1992, Rowthorn 1992,
Barth & Zweimüller 1995). Another strand of the literature analyses bargaining cen-
tralisation in an efficiency wage framework (Hoel 1989, Rodseth 1993).
This paper differs from the papers mentioned above in two respects. First, it extends
the existing literature by considering the impact of different structures of wage setting
centralisation in a dual labour market. In contrast to most of the literature,1 the econ-
1An exception is the brief discussion in Booth (1995) which is based on the analysis of trade unions in a
two-sector economy in Oswald (1979).
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omy is assumed to consist of a unionised and a competitive sector where the union’s
outside option is determined endogenously in the latter one. Two contrary wage set-
ting scenarios are considered to study the impact of centralisation: decentralised wage
formation at the firm level and centralised wage setting by a large union acting at the
sector level. The rationale is straightforward: when each union acts independently at
the firm level, it maximises its own utility ignoring the impacts on the outside option.
But this point will not hold in the case of centralised wage formation if there is only
one large union in the economy. Then the union has to take into account that a higher
wage in the unionised sector increases labour supply in the competitive sector.
Second, the paper analyses the impact of different union objective functions on so-
cial welfare under both centralised and decentralised wage setting. There is much
literature on wage bargaining where unions are in general assumed to maximise an
objective function depending on wage and employment levels. In the following, I will
focus on two approaches: wage-bill maximisation and rent maximisation. While the
first approach is based on the seminal work by Dunlop (1944), the latter one was de-
veloped by Rosen (1970) and de Menil (1971). Dunlop (1944), and later on Hieser
(1970) and Johnston (1972), argued that the union wishes to maximise the total in-
come, i. e. the wage-bill, of its members. However, Rosen (1970) and de Menil (1971)
assume the real wage surplus to be the appropriate maximand. That is, the union max-
imises the difference between total wage income in the unionised sector and wage
income under competitive conditions (Oswald 1979). In labour economics literature,
both approaches are often treated to be very similar (Oswald 1985, Pencavel 1991,
Booth 1995). But they yield the same labour market outcome if and only if the outside
option, i. e. the wage in the competitive sector, is exogenous from the union’s point
of view. In the following, it will be shown that employment and wages resulting from
both approaches differ if this assumption is abandoned. That is, the welfare effects of
wage setting centralisation depend significantly on the structure of union’s objective
function.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyses
the labour market outcome assuming the union to be wage-bill maximising, while
section 4 studies the impacts of a rent maximising union. In both sections, I distinguish
between decentralised and centralised wage setting and point out the respective welfare
effects. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model Framework
The economy consists of two sectors, a unionised and a competitive one. Workers are
mobile between the sectors, i. e. those workers displaced from the unionised sector
will flood into the competitive sector. The wage in the unionised sector w is set mo-
nopolistically either by a small union at the firm level or by a large union covering all
workers. For given wage, firms then choose the level of employment. The wage in the
competitive sector b equalises labour demand and supply. There are λ homogeneous
firms and an equal number of unions in the unionised sector, whereas the number of
firms in the competitive sector is normalised to unity. Firm location in both sectors
is assumed to be exogenous. Let N denote the total available workforce in each firm
in the unionised sector. The total workforce in the economy is denoted by Z. Each
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour. The utility out of the wage either in
the unionised or the competitive sector is assumed to be linear in the respective wages.
Furthermore, by assumption all workers are identical and union members.2
Production functions in both sectors are characterised by diminishing returns to
labour, constant elasticities and satisfy the usual Inada conditions. The production
function of a representative firm in the unionised sector is denoted by f (L), with L
being the employed workforce in the firm as a single input. Firms in both sectors sell
their output in a competitive goods market, where the output prices are normalised to
unity. Firm’s profit can then be written as
Π = f (L)−wL.
Labour demand can be derived from the maximisation of firm’s profit and is determined
by the marginal productivity condition
L = f ′−1(w). (1)
The production technology in the competitive sector may differ from the technology in
the unionised sector. A representative firm’s production function is denoted by g(M),
with M denoting employment in the competitive sector. Since M is exogenous from the
firm’s point of view, the wage b will be determined such that the marginal productivity
2Dittrich & Schirwitz (2006) relax this restricting assumption in a dynamic bargaining framework by
allowing for workers displaced from the unionised sector to leave the union.
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condition holds:
b = g′(M). (2)
As stated before, total population Z consists of workers employed in λ firms in the
unionised sector and of workers in the competitive sector. Thus, the workforce in the
competitive sector can be written as
M = Z−λL, (3)
implying the clearing of the labour market.
Before analysing the labour market effects of union wage setting, I will shed some
light on the welfare optimum in the economy. A social planner would set an employ-
ment allocation such that the overall output in both sectors is maximised, i. e.
max
L
V = λ f (L)+g(M) (4)
s. t. Z = λL+M,
with V denoting social welfare.3 Maximising (4) with respect to L yields the condition
of the welfare optimum:
f ′(L) = g′(M). (5)
According to (5), social welfare is maximised if marginal productivities of workers in
both sectors are equal. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal employment allocation λL∗ and
M∗, where the (inverse) labour demand functions in both sectors are pictured by f ′(L)
and g′(M).
3Pencavel (1991) discusses alternative forms of social welfare. For instance, maximising a utilitaristic
objective function yields the same result.
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Figure 1: Welfare maximising employment allocation in a two-sector economy.
3 Wage-Bill Maximising Union
Decentralised Wage Setting
First, the case where the wage rate is determined by a monopolistic union at the firm
level is considered.4 Both unions and firms take the competitive wage as given. The
representative union maximises the total wage-bill of its members taking into account
the firm’s labour demand (1). Hence, the union has to solve the maximisation problem
max
w
Ud1 = Lw+(N−L)b (6)
s. t. L = f ′−1(w).
Maximising (6) with respect to w and making some rearrangements yield the familiar
result
wd1 = bd1
(
ηLw
1+ηLw
)
, (7)
4Applying the more general right-to-manage approach would not change the qualitative results but only
calculations get more complicated.
6
Welfare Effects of Union Bargaining Centralisation Marcus Dittrich
with ηLw = ∂L∂w
w
L denoting the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage in
the unionised sector. Following the literature, it is assumed that ηLw < −1.5 There is
thus η
L
w
1+ηLw
> 1, implying that the union sets a mark-up on the competitive wage. Firms
react with a reduce in employment yielding Ld1 < L∗.
Centralised Wage Setting
These results are only valid if unions are indeed large enough to have significant wage
setting power but are too small to recognise the wage and employment consequences
of their behaviour in the second sector. In the following, the case of centralised wage
formation by a large union covering all workers is analysed. This union takes into ac-
count the wage effect in the competitive sector when setting the wage in the unionised
sector. The higher the wage in the unionised sector, the lower employment is there.
Since workers always work either in the unionised or in the competitive sector, this
leads to higher employment and a lower wage in the competitive sector. If the union
sets a mark-up on the competitive wage, a lower outside option reduces the union
wage. If wage setting is decentralised at the firm level and if there is a large number of
unions, each of them neglects the impact of its wage setting behaviour on the wage and
employment in the second sector. However, this assumption cannot be maintained if
wage setting takes place centralised at a sectoral level. The union now pays attention to
the fact that the outside option depends on employment in the unionised sector. Using
(2) and (3), the competitive wage can be written as a function of employment in the
unionised sector:
b = g′(Z−λL). (8)
The union covers all Z workers and is assumed to maximise the total wage-bill. Hence,
the maximisation problem can be expressed as
max
w
Uc1 = λLw+(Z−λL)b (9)
s. t. L = f ′−1(w)
b = g′(Z−λL)
5This condition is satisfied by any conventional kind of production function with constant elasticities,
e. g. the standard Cobb-Douglas function f (L) = Lα with α ∈ (0,1).
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Solving (9) with respect to the wage and making some rearrangements yield the fol-
lowing equation defining the wages in both sectors:
wc1 = bc1
(
ηLw
1+ηLw
)(
1+ηMb
ηMb
)
, (10)
with ηMb = ∂M∂b
b
M <−1 being the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage
in the competitive sector. Overall, the wage will be set by the union such that the
benefit increase due to a marginal wage increase equals the marginal cost from both
a reduction in employment and a reduction in the competitive wage for all workers
employed in the competitive sector. As stated before, the crucial point is now that the
union takes into account the impact of its behaviour on the competitive wage since it
maximises the total wage-bill. Hence, according to this additional effect compared to
decentralised wage setting, the mark-up on the competitive wage is lower if the union
acts centralised. This can easily be shown by comparing (7) and (10) and reminding
that 1+η
M
b
ηMb
∈ (0,1).
Moreover, depending on the value of the elasticities in both sectors, the welfare
maximising allocation can be obtained. If ηLw > ηMb , the union wage exceeds the com-
petitive wage. This fact causes an excess burden, but smaller than under decentralised
wage setting. Otherwise, if ηLw = ηMb , wages in both sectors are equal and the welfare
maximising allocation is obtained. If ηLw < ηMb , the competitive wage would be higher
than the unionised one. However, this would lead to some workers moving from the
unionised to the competitive sector until both wages are equalised. Therefore, it can
be stated that the welfare optimum is reached if ηLw ≤ ηMb .
Comparing the labour market outcomes under the two various institutional settings,
it is easy to see that the union sets a higher wage if acting at the firm level. Since
firms choose employment according to their labour demand curves, employment in the
unionised sector is higher in the centralised case. Contrary, the competitive wage is
higher and employment in the competitive sector is lower under decentralised wage
setting. The resulting dead-weight loss Dd1 is defined by
Dd1 =
L∗∫
Ld1
λ f ′(L)−g′(M) dL. (11)
8
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This is due to the fact that those workers between Ld1 and L∗ would be more productive
if working in the unionised sector. Under centralised wage setting, there is no dead-
weight loss. However, as stated above, this result only holds if ηLw ≤ ηMb . Otherwise,
the dead-weight loss Dc1 would be positive but always less than (the absolute value of)
Dd1 .
Figure 2 shows the labour market outcome of bargaining centralisation if the union
maximises the wage-bill. Employment is chosen by the firms according to the marginal
productivity conditions. The optimal employment levels under decentralised wage
setting are given by λLd1 and Md1 , while the centralised case outcome is pictured by
λLc1 and Mc1. The dead-weight loss caused by decentralised union wage setting is
illustrated by the triangle ABC.
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Figure 2: Wages and employment under a wage-bill maximising union.
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4 Rent Maximising Union
Decentralised Wage Setting
If the union maximises the gain from working in the union sector over the outside
option, the objective function to be maximised is given by
max
w
Ud2 = L(w−b) (12)
s. t. L = f ′−1(w).
Solving (12) with respect to the wage yields
wd2 = bd2
(
ηLw
1+ηLw
)
(13)
which is equivalent to (7). Hence, the wages set by a wage-bill and a rent maximising
union are the same. This is due to the fact that the wage in the competitive sector
is exogenous from the union’s point of view. Thus, there is no difference between
maximising the rents accruing to the workers in the unionised sector or maximising
the total income of workers in both the unionised and the competitive sector.
Centralised Wage Setting
A centralised union wishes to maximise the wage surplus in all λ firms taking into
account the competitive sector outcome. Therefore, it is moreover subject to changes
in the competitive sector outcome due to its wage setting behaviour. It faces the opti-
misation problem
max
w
Uc2 = λL(w−b) (14)
s. t. L = f ′−1(w)
b = g′(Z−λL).
Maximisation with respect to the wage yields
wc2 = bc2
(
ηLw
1+ηLw
)(
1+ηLb
ηLb
)
, (15)
10
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with ηLb = ∂L∂b
b
L denoting the elasticity of labour demand in the unionised sector with
respect to changes in the competitive wage. Because a higher competitive wage causes
lower employment in the competitive sector and thus more employment in the unionised
sector, it follows that ηLb > 0 and
1+ηLb
ηLb
> 1. Comparing (13) and (15), it is easy to see
that the union’s mark-up on the outside option is higher than in the decentralised case.
This is due to the fact that the union only cares for the workers in the unionised sector.
By setting a higher wage, the gain from working in the union sector over the outside
option can be increased because the competitive wage decreases.
The welfare effects are straightforward. A first-best optimum is neither reached
under decentralised nor under centralised wage setting. However, it can be checked
that social welfare is higher in the decentralised case. The respective dead-weight
losses can be calculated in the same manner as in (11). In figure 3, they are pictured
by the triangles ABC and ADE.
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Figure 3: Wages and employment under a rent maximising union.
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the labour market outcome of two extreme regimes of wage set-
ting centralisation in a dual labour market. It can be shown that welfare effects of
wage setting centralisation are ambiguous and depend significantly on the structure of
the union’s objective function. If the union maximises the total wage-bill of workers
both in the unionised and in the competitive sector, employment in the unionised sector
and social welfare are higher in the centralised scenario. This is caused by a centralised
union taking into account the consequences of its wage setting behaviour on the com-
petitive sector outcome. In other words, this union considers that a higher union wage
would decrease the wage in the competitive sector. A decentralised acting union will
not take into account these effects and will thus set a higher wage. Moreover, the opti-
mal employment allocation may be obtained in the centralised setting if the elasticity
of labour demand in the unionised sector does not exceed the labour demand elasticity
in the competitive sector.
However, if the union is rent maximising, employment in the unionised sector and
social welfare are higher under decentralised bargaining. A centralised union indeed
takes into account the consequences of its wage setting behaviour on the competitive
sector outcome. But since it does not care for the workers in the competitive sector,
a higher wage is set to maximise the aggregate gain from employment in the union
sector over the outside option. In both settings, the union sets a mark-up on the com-
petitive wage. Thus, the social optimum is not obtained, neither under decentralised
nor under centralised bargaining. The second-best allocation would then be attained
with decentralised bargaining at the firm-level. To finally determine the welfare effects
of wage setting centralisation, a precise definition of the empirically relevant union’s
objective function is important.
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Appendix: Mathematical Derivations
Wage-Bill Maximising Union
Under decentralised wage setting, maximising (6) with respect to w yields
∂Ud1
∂w =
∂L
∂w(w−b)+L = 0
⇔ ∂L∂w
w
L
(w−b)+w = 0
⇔ w(1+ηLw)−bηLw = 0.
Reformulating gives (7).
In the centralised framework, maximising (9) gives
∂Uc1
∂w = λ
( ∂L
∂ww+L
)
−λ ∂L∂wb−λ (Z−λL)
∂b
∂M
∂L
∂w = 0
⇔ ∂L∂w(w−b)+L−λ (N−L)
∂b
∂M
∂L
∂w = 0
⇔ ∂L∂w
w
L
(w−b)+w−λ (N−L) ∂b∂M
∂L
∂w
w
L
= 0
⇔ w(1+ηLw)−bηLw−
∂b
∂M Mη
L
w = 0
⇔ w(1+ηLw)−bηLw
(
1+
∂b
∂M
M
b
)
= 0.
Reformulating and considering ∂b∂M
M
b =
1
ηMb
yields (10).
Rent Maximising Union
The first-order condition under decentralised wage setting is the same as in the wage-
bill maximising case. With centralised wage setting, (14) is differentiated with respect
to w:
∂Uc2
∂w =
∂L
∂w(w−b)+L
(
1− ∂b∂L
∂L
∂w
)
= 0
⇔ ∂L∂w
w
L
(w−b)+w
(
1− ∂b∂L
∂L
∂w
)
= 0
13
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⇔ w(1+ηLw)−bηLw−w ∂b∂L ∂L∂w = 0
⇔ w(1+ηLw)−bηLw−ηLw ∂b∂LL = 0
⇔ w(1+ηLw)−bηLw(1+ ∂b∂L Lb
)
= 0.
Reformulating and considering ∂b∂L
L
b =
1
ηLb
yields (15).
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